Located near the downtown core of Winnipeg, Manitoba, the 300,000-sf CSCHAH accommodates approximately 350 people in three different scientific programs: the National Microbiology Laboratory, a Health Canada operation much like the laboratories of the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the National Centre for Foreign Animal Diseases, part of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency roughly equivalent to the American USDA-APHIS; and the Office of Biosafety and Environment.

"One of the unique aspects of this site is that we are the only facility in the world housing high containment labs—biosafety levels 2, 3, and 4—for human and animal health research," says Dr. Stefan Wagener, CSCHAH's chief administrative officer and scientific director for Biosafety and Environment.

The institution's existing emergency preparedness program was extensive enough for Wagener to observe that "after the crash, we didn't change or modify any of our procedures."

This is not to say that either the accident or security are taken lightly. Far from it. In addition to the customary complement of gates, guards, and closed-circuit TV, along with multiple levels of control to enter the labs, the CSCHAH has a comprehensive emergency plan anticipating a wide range of scenarios, and its efforts on this front are continual.

"We interact frequently with local, provincial, and federal law enforcement and emergency response groups to establish plans that meet the needs of our facility," says Wagener. While he prefers not to specify the intervals between meetings, he does allow that "this communication is both formally prescribed and informal, and it is ongoing."

Preparedness Considerations

Although an evolving process, emergency preparedness starts with a raft of questions which often outnumber the answers immediately at hand. Ultimately, the resulting plan will vary according to the individual facility's mission and location, but it should specify the systems and resources necessary to cope with each condition or contingency identified, Wagener says.

The following areas are addressed in the CSCHAH plan:

Natural hazards and severe weather: Manitoba may be more prone to flooding than earthquakes, but all such conditions must be taken into account.

Terrorism: The site is viewed not so much as a target for destruction but could be a terrorist objective as a source for potentially harmful agents.

Fire or explosion: A fire within the BSL-4 laboratory is allowed to burn itself out. Although ventilation and decontamination issues for personnel must be resolved, one reassuring factor for the public is that the heat will kill the organisms under study.

The potential release of infectious agents or hazardous materials: "This is something that people are always always concerned about," states Wagener.

Environmental protection: As the only facility in continental North America currently working with foot-and-mouth disease, this is a significant issue.

Workplace violence, unrest, and opposition: Headlines over the past decade have made it imperative to anticipate such events from a facility point of view—especially considering the possible loss of critical building services and sabotage—as well as the perspective of personal safety.

Wagener also recommends envisioning the worst possible accident that could occur at the facility in order to develop an appropriate response.

"It might be the loss of human lives, the release of an agent, or the facility's destruction, or it might be a combination of all three," he says. "No matter what, you have to know what your worst-case scenario is, and ask how you are prepared for it."

Emergency Strategies

In addition to the overall emergency management plan, Wagener stresses the need to develop preparedness strategies in three important areas: response teams, business continuity, and crisis communication.

Response Teams
Individuals and groups should be identified and provided with the equipment and logistical resources necessary to respond to specific events. Along with interfacing with the community's first responders, team members should have adequate training, especially if hazardous material is involved. The extent of hazmat training should be specified, ranging from simple awareness to the ability to perform remediation procedures.

An important issue to determine is who enters the high-containment area. The institution must be sensitive to the concerns of outside personnel, such as firefighters and police (and their families), who may not understand the safeguards in place to protect them while on the premises.

"Perception is everything," states Wagener. "The only way to deal with folks in a really efficient way is by addressing the risks they perceive in your facility."

Wagener suggests inviting outside personnel to be part of the planning process for this type of facility, even in the design phase, so that they are familiar with the layout and can decide where they will and will not go. Local first responders might refuse to enter a high containment lab, in which case the institution will have to designate its own personnel to transport the injured to triage at a specified point. Working these details out in advance can be life-saving.

An often-overlooked aspect of emergency response is lay training in life-safety equipment. For instance, given the normal egress from a BSL-4 lab, with a decontamination process that can take 15 minutes or more, an initiative to train scientists on a defibrillator could be appropriate.

Business Continuity
Planning for business continuity entails identifying mission-critical activities and providing for them no matter what the external circumstances—man-made or natural disaster. Observing that most BSL-4 facilities have a public health mandate, Wagener stresses the need to keep certain functions or services operational, either through redundancy or by transferring them to an alternate site.

"If you're the only facility in the world doing a certain diagnostic test, you need to know where and how you can do this test if your lab suddenly goes down," he says.

He advises nearby facilities to establish common aid agreements so they can serve as back-up locations for each other, similar to the understanding CSCHAH has adopted with another federal laboratory inside Winnipeg. He also recommends including scientists in planning discussions to pinpoint essential equipment and arrange for replacements.

"We are looking into getting mobile containment cabinets, so that we have some portability and some mobility solutions if we have to leave the Winnipeg facility," he says.

Crisis Communication
In the middle of an emergency, communication is often the first thing to fall by the wayside, observes Wagener. Pointing out the importance of public support to research labs, he advocates establishing proactive relationships with the press and local residents well before a surprise event might spark alarm.

CSCHAH has worked hard to promote positive interaction with the Winnipeg community, and actually received an award for its efforts. Still, the backing is fragile.

"Unfortunately, it takes just one incident and a hard-earned reputation can go down the drain," he comments.

Even something as simple as a fire truck parked in front of the building could create a great deal anxiety in the neighborhood.

"The community would not know that the fire chief was here for a meeting, and that he had the vehicle with him because he was on duty," Wagener remarks.

To deal with public fears and perceptions, the Centre recently developed an incident communication system (separate from its existing incident management system) so such occurrences will be clarified.

"People outside the facility know they will be informed simply because they have the right to know," says Wagener.

Biosecurity

Among the primary elements that should enter into biosecurity planning are the biological materials themselves, along with facility personnel, staff, and scientists alike. The individual mission also plays a part, as does the location—not so much an issue for limited-access military or federal facilities, but a real conundrum given the open design of the university environment. Risk analysis and response plans should also be drawn up.

Microorganisms, like chemicals and radioisotopes, can be hidden with relative ease. However, they are much more difficult to monitor; plus they have the distinctive ability to grow and change. Without devices or techniques to screen for them, it is theoretically possible for someone to remove a minute quantity of an agent without detection.

"A virus or a bacterium or a parasite will grow very quickly, which means that only minimal material amounts are necessary for someone to do something harmful if he or she knows how to do it," says Wagener.

The potential human involvement in such an event leads to the second biggest area of concern, the staff and the scientists. Despite security clearances and strong relationships, people are vulnerable to outside pressure, especially when family welfare may be threatened, Wagener points out. For this reason, CSCHAH has worked with law enforcement to initiate a higher level of surveillance and security in the neighborhoods.

"At first, our scientists thought this was overkill, but now they are very appreciative of it," he remarks.

This reaction is typical of the changing mindset that must take hold among researchers as they face the need to alter long-standing routines to comply with new security measures and governmental regulations. According to Wagener, they are much more likely to cooperate if they understand that biosecurity is a combined effort requiring the participation of all personnel to be successful. He also advises consulting with reputable outside security experts to avoid reinventing the wheel.

The bottom line of preparedness is "how do you know if something is missing?"

"If you can answer that question, you have a very good biosecurity program," Wagener says.

By Nicole Zaro Stahl

We welcome your Questions and Comments

Copyright 2008 Tradeline Inc.
All Rights Reserved
ISSN: 1096-4894